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ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL

1.

Under Utah Code 34-28-5, if a separated employee makes a written demand

to his former employer for unpaid wages and the employer fails to pay those wages
within 24 hours, the employee is entitled to a statutory penalty. Here, Grimm sent an
email to DxNA containing various categories of claimed compensation, different and
confusing spreadsheets, and proposing to meet with DxNA to make any "adjustments" to
the referenced amounts and to work out payment terms over time. Did the trial court err
in concluding that the email was not a written demand under the statute?
Standard of Review. Grimm presents this issue as one of pure statutory

interpretation. Br. 2-3. In reality, it presents a mixed question: whether a given set of
facts (the January 23 email) constituted a written demand under the statute. This requires
reviewing the trial court's findings as to the January 23 email and the email's impact on
DxNA's actions in deciding whether or not to pay Grimm within 24 hours. Those
findings are entitled to deference. See State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, iJil 21-24, 144 P.3d
1096.
Preservation. We agree with Grimm that this issue was preserved. See also R.

707-709 (DxNA's Trial Brief); R. 864-867 (DxNA's Post-Trial Brief.)
2.

Under Utah Code section 34-27-1, employees may recover attorney fees in

a wage suit if they make a written demand for wages and later prove entitlement to the
amounts owed. Here, Grimm emailed DxNA a proposal which contained various

@
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different amounts and categories which exceeded what he was awarded at trial. Did the
trial court err in not awarding him attorney fees under the statute?

Standard of Review. This also presents a mixed question. See State v. Levin,
2006 UT 50, ,I,I 21-24.

Preservation. We agree with Grimm that this issue was preserved. See also R.
709-710 (DxNA's Trial Brief); R. 868-869 (DxNA's Post-Trial Brief.)
3.

Section 2.2 of the employment agreement allowing Grimm paid vacation

{PTO) allows its accrual and carryover only "in conformity with DxNA's normal
vacation pay practices." The trial court heard evidence concerning those practices and
determined that they did not apply to DxNA's CEO and thus Grimm was exempt from
the policies applicable to rank-and-file employees. Did the trial court err in its PTO
award to Grimm?

Standard of Review. "As a general proposition, questions regarding the
construction and interpretation of a contract are reviewed as a matter of law and we
afford no deference to a lower court's ruling." Watkins v. Ford, 2013 UT 31, ,I 19,304
P .3d 841. But where, as here, there is an ambiguity requiring a review of extrinsic
~

evidence, "it must give deference to the lower court's findings of fact." Id.

Preservation. This issue was preserved. R. 957-958, 996-997.

2
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FACTS RELEVANT TO CROSS-APPEAL

On January 23, 2011, two days after Grimm and Jennings met to discuss Grimm's
termination, Grimm sent Jennings an email. (R.942168; Pl. Ex. 17.) 1 The subject line
of the email stated, "Meeting Follow Up." (Pl. Ex. 17.) Grimm began the email by
advising Jennings that he was "emailing [Jennings] a reconciliation of amounts owed and
created through my layoff." (Pl. Ex. 17.) He attached spreadsheets which he admitted

®

contained differing amounts depending on which employment agreement was referred to:
"As you are probably aware, there are three potential employment agreements that could
be used with one having 15 weeks of severance and the other two, 26 weeks." (Pl.
Ex. 17.)
Grimm listed the "components" of his claimed compensation as expense reports,
unpaid payroll, PTO, and severance. (R.942168; Pl. Ex. 17.) His spreadsheets showed
the various calculations for each, including a range of numbers for his claimed severance:

~

either 15 weeks at [$72,836.48] or 26 weeks at [$126,249.89], depending on the
employment agreement. 2 (R. 942 1 68; Pl. Ex. 17.)
Grimm included additional amounts that he claimed he was owed. (Pl. Ex. 17.)

~

He "included interest through the termination date," which he claimed was "consistent
with what has been offered to other shareholders for loans." (Pl. Ex. 17.) He also threw

1

The January 23 email, Plaintiffs Exhibit 17, is attached to DxNA' s Opening Brief at
Addendum E.
2

The trial court's findings reference 15 weeks at "$72,150 or 26 weeks at $150,000,"
but those are not the numbers that Grimm claimed in the spreadsheets attached to his
January 23 email. (Pl. Ex. 17 - Add. E.)
3
@
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in "an amount for HRA reimbursement," and his claimed 2% stock. (R.942170; Pl. Ex.
17.) (Grimm expressly abandoned the claim to HRA reimbursement at trial, explaining

~

to the trial court that his inclusion of that item was not proper. (R. Trial Tr. vol. IV
115:2-18.).) The sum total in Grimm's email amounted to $364,544.25. 3 (R.942168;
Pl. Ex. 17.) Grimm then wrote:
As we are both aware, Utah State law requires settlement of amounts owed within
24 hours of termination of employment. However, as we discussed, this
requirement could cause immediate financial challenges for the Company so we
agreed to try and find an acceptable means of getting this balance paid. Of
immediate concern to me is the method of type of security provided to insure that
the outstanding amount owed will be paid and not discharged at some later date
and I believe both you and Jeff were supportive of this logic. Therefore, let me
propose the following. All outstanding balances will continue to accrue interest at
a rate similar to that ofloans made by other shareholders (currently 12%). The
outstanding balance will be secured either by guarantee of the shareholders or
through a first lien right. I would believe that the best strategy would be to secure
it in the $5mm amount that advances Glory. A payment schedule will be
developed to provide for settlement of the balance and accruing interest. Initially,
the amount of the monthly commitment will be $10,000 per month and will
mutually agree to an accelerated amount as the business begins to establish
revenue.
(R. 942171; Pl. Ex. 17.)
Grimm went further, telling Jennings that the two should sit down in a week,
review the details behind Grimm's numbers, and make any necessary adjustments:
I would like to reach some level of understanding tomorrow related to the
mechanics of payoff and security to support the debt. Then we can sit down to
review the details behind the amounts owed and make any adjustments needed
when I get back from my travels in a week.
(R.942171; Pl. Ex. 17.)

3

That number assumes the 26 weeks' severance Grimm was seeking, which is
ultimately what he sued for. (R. 11-14.)
4
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([&)

Finally, Grimm acknowledged that he had yet to provide all the backup (receipts)
(!;)

to support the expense reimbursements he was claiming and committed to provide DxNA
with that documentation in the future:
I look forward to getting quick resolution to all of the above matters and will be
available to speak with you as needed. I am in the process of organizing my files
to pass to Ernie and also organizing the supporting documentation (receipts)
behind my weekly expenses. As I showed you last week, I keep very organized
documentation in this area and strong separation between personal and business
items.
(Pl. Ex. 17.)
In a follow up email to Jennings one week later, Grimm confirmed that his
January 23 email was not a demand. (Def. Ex. 57 - Jan. 30, 2011 email from Grimm to
Jennings, attached at Addendum F.) He stated, "I did not consider my proposal a list of

~

demands, rather a suggestion on how to deal with items .... " (Def. Ex. 57.)
DxNA did not pay Grimm his suggested amounts within 24 hours of his January
23 email. (R. 943, 73; 936, 27.) Grimm sued DxNA for the statutory penalty for
unpaid wages under Utah Code section 34-28-5 because, he alleged, he "demanded
payment of wages due, in writing, on January 23, 2011," and did not receive them. (R.

~

15-16; Am. Compl. ,, 39-46.) He also sought his attorney fees under Utah Code section
34-27-1. (R. 16-17; Am. Compl. ,, 47-51.)
The trial court rejected both claims. (R. 959-961.) It found that the January 23
email was not a written demand as contemplated by the statute. (R. 960.) Rather, it was
a proposal accompanied "with some documentation of the amounts he requested with
interest added. Those supporting documents are not a model of clarity and are, in fact,

5
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confusing at best." (R. 960.) It found that "[t]he fundamental problem with the email for
purposes of satisfying the statute at issue is that the email is not a demand to be paid
wages within 24 hours." (R. 960.) Though the "statute specifies that the wages are due
immediately, it is the written demand from the employee that triggers the 24-hour period
~

and the penalty if the amount is not paid." (R. 960.) It found that "Grimm's email does
not demand payment within 24 hours. Instead it suggests that an alternative arrangement
of payments over time with interest would be acceptable. Grimm also confounds the
"demand" with an acknowledgement that the amounts owing were subject to
adjustment." (R. 960.) It continued, "[w]hile Grimm's email certainly put DxNA on
notice of his claims, it cannot be construed to be a demand of the kind contemplated in
the statute. For that reason, the statutory penalty was not triggered and is therefore not
owed." (R. 961.)
For the same reasons, the trial court rejected Grimm's claim to attorney fees under
section 34-27-1. "That statute," the trial court explained, "contemplated a written
demand for wages 15 days before suit is brought. A demand contemplates a clear
requires for immediate payment, not a proposal for payment over time with specific
arrangements to be worked out in the future. For this reason, no attorney fees will be
awarded." (R. 961.)
Grimm appeals from those rulings.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Grimm did not make a written demand as contemplated by Utah Code

section 34-28-5. His January 23 email was a proposal. He called it a proposal. He did
6
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Git

not demand anything be paid within 24 hours. Instead, he provided a list of things he
might be owed, including various ranges of amounts for some of these items. He
acknowledged that an "adjustment" might be necessary and that he and DxNA could sit
down and work it through. He followed his January 23 email with another email,
expressly indicating that his January 23 email was not a demand. Having invited DxNA
to take the time to consider his email, to review the amounts claimed therein, and having
acknowledged that adjustments were coming, Grimm can express no surprise that DxNA
did not pay him within 24 hours of receiving the January 23 email. That's not the
response he invited or demanded. The trial court's refusal to award Grimm the statutory
penalty was correct in all respects.
2.

For the same reasons, the trial court properly rejected Grimm's claim to

attorney fees under section 34-27-1. That statute also requires a written demand. Grimm
claims that the January 23 email was his demand. But as explained, that is not a written
@

demand. Moreover, even if the January 23 email constitutes a "demand," it included
amounts in excess of what Grimm was awarded at trial. A party is not entitled to attorney
fees if his ultimate award is less than the amounts claimed in the demand. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in not awarding him attorney fees under section 34-27-1.
3.

Finally, Grimm claims the trial court erred in its interpretation of Section

2.2 of the employment agreement and its award of PTO. However, he fails to confront
the fact that Section 2.2 expressly references that this payment accrues "in conformity
with the Employer's normal vacation pay practices." Those practices are not defined in
the employment agreement, but were subject to proof at trial. And after considering the
7
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evidence at trial, the trial court found that the "pay practices" in DxNA's employee
handbook as applied to rank-and-file employees did not apply to the CEO Grimm. And
further, that Grimm did not follow DxNA' s policies. As a result, the trial court
interpreted Section 2.2 to only apply to unused and unpaid PTO for 2010, concluding that
it could not have accrued and carried over year-to-year as with rank-and-file employees.
This interpretation is reasonable given the surrounding evidence and the trial court's
findings as to DxNA's policies. It is entitled to deference and should not be disturbed.
ARGUMENT IN REPLY

I.

The Trial Court Never Found Mutual Assent as to the Unresolved Terms.
A.

The issue presented is a legal issue arising from the trial court's findings
of fact.

Grimm first argues (at 30-32) that DxNA failed to marshal the evidence. That
argument is convenient but incorrect. The mere fact that there was a four-day trial does
not insulate the trial court's conclusions or automatically trigger a duty to marshal.
Rather, as explained in DxNA' s opening brief, the question of whether an enforceable
employment agreement exists between Grimm and DxNA is based entirely on the facts as
the trial court found them. See DxNA Br. 30-44. And whether those facts demonstrate
that a contract exists between the parties is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
See Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT App 101,127,276 P.3d 1178. The marshaling doctrine
imposes no obstacle to this Court's review of that ultimate legal question based on the
facts as the trial court found them. Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P .2d 368,
373 (Utah 1996). See also Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991)

8
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(reversing court of appeals for "automatically" affirming judgment in absence of
challenge to fact findings, explaining that even if factual findings are unchallenged it is
"incumbent on that court to review the trial court's conclusions of law and its application
of the law to the facts as found").

B.

The trial court's own findings demonstrate the lack of an enforceable
employment agreement as a matter of law.

Grimm spends nearly 14 pages in his brief quoting case law and laboring to
justify the trial court's enforcement of an employment agreement that Grimm rejected.
Br. 32-46. But it is much simpler than that. Grimm sued DxNA for breach of a specific
employment contract-one that contained 26 weeks' severance, among other features.
(R. 11-14.) Grimm claimed that this version of the contract is the one that the parties
signed. (R. 11-14.) The trial court expressly found that this did not happen. (R. 948.)
Moreover, Grimm testified, without equivocation, that he "never agreed" to 15 weeks'
severance. (R. 1548 Trial Tr. vol. II 162: 15-1 7.)
Still, the trial court enforced DxNA's last offer-one with 15 weeks'
severance-under the twin rationale that 1) Grimm later "acknowledged this possible
@

outcome" and 2) DxNA could not complain about that outcome since it was willing to
offer at least that much. (R. 947-48.) As we explained, that is not mutual assent under
Utah contract law. See DxNA Br. 30-40. Stated simply, Grimm does not get to sue
DxNA for breach of a specific employment agreement that he claimed the parties agreed
to and signed, fail to meet his burden of proof to show that the parties did so, but obtain

9
~

STG_722453

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a judgment for enforcement and breach of a different version-one that Grimm
expressly "never agreed" to. Yet, that is precisely what the trial court allowed here.
Grimm's extensive effort to tease out a conclusion and rationale different from
the one the trial court itself found by using the various scenarios that the trial court
kicked around before making its ultimate decision and findings cannot wash away the
legal error. Those scenarios-the possibilities-for what happened to the employment
agreement provide no basis from which to manufacture acceptance from rejection. This
Court should reverse.
II.

The Court Should Not Affirm a Prejudgment Interest Award That Each
Party Agrees was Awarded in Error.
Grimm concedes he is not entitled to the 10% prejudgment interest he was

awarded. Br. 46-47. He nevertheless contends that this Court should affirm the error
because DxNA should have known that the case Grimm cited below for this award,
Francis v. Nat'/ DME, 2015 UT App 119,350 P.3d 615, was affirmed because of the
appellant's briefing failure and not because the law was settled. On the surface, that
appears to be a fair criticism. But it does not justify affirming what all parties agree was
error. This is so for two reasons.
First, Francis expressly affirmed an award of prejudgment interest under section
15-1-1 for non-payment of wages. That is the issue in this case. The appellant in Francis
argued that section 15-1-1 did not apply based exclusively on Chief Justice Zimmerman's
footnote in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d

10
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514 (Utah 1994), 4 observing in dicta that section 15-1-1 may have some limitations based
61

on its plain language. See 2015 UT App I 19,140. A panel of this Court determined that
this was not sufficient briefing. See id. 141. But it did not reject the matter outright
under Rule 24(a)(9). See id. 5 It discussed the matter in detail and recognized that it had
applied section 15-1-1 in matters other than loans or forbearances. See id. 1 41. That is
the reality of this statute: It has received such broad application over time that its
application to judgments in a variety of contexts absent a different stated prejudgment
interest rate is generally assumed as a matter of course. See USA Power, LLC v.
PacifiC01p, 2016 UT 20, 1107, 372 P.3d 629 (recognizing that its case law has suggested
broad application of section 15-1-1 ). 6 Thus, as applied to wage claims, any fair reading
of Francis is that this Court rejected the plain language argument.
Still, Grimm faults DxNA for not challenging Francis below even though its best
argument for doing so-the statute's plain language-was rejected in Francis as a wholly
insufficient basis to even consider not applying the statute to a wage claim. But as USA
Power ultimately held, it was a simple plain language analysis that finally fenced in
section 15-1-1. That simple analysis, the one Chief Justice Zimmerman advanced in his

4

Consolidation Coal Co. was abrogated on other grounds by State ex rel. School &
Inst. Trust Land Admin. v. Mathis, 2009 UT 85, 223 P.3d 1119.
5

See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). More often than not when an issue is inadequately
briefed, the reviewing court will not touch its substance. See Benjamin v. State Tax
Comm 'n, 2011 UT 14, 1 31 n.8, 250 P .3d 39; CORA USA LLC v. Quick Change Artist
LLC, 2017 UT App 66, 11 5-6.
6

Recognizing this, when Grimm cited Francis below to support his claim to interest
under 15-1-1, he did not temper that citation in any respect. (R. 923.)
11
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Consolidation Coal footnote, vindicated the appellant in Francis as it took nothing more

than pointing to the plain language of the statute to restrict its scope. See 2016 UT 20, ,r,r
107-109. USA Power did what the Francis panel refused to do: apply a plain language
interpretation of section 15-1-1 to limit its coverage, just as the Consolidation Coal
footnote said should have been done all along, and just as the appellant in Francis
claimed to no avail. In context, the issue was not as unstable as Grimm claims.
Second, the fact remains that the imposition of 10% interest under section 15-1-1
was error. That is not in dispute. Grimm asks this Court to uphold that error based on
preservation grounds alone. The preservation requirement is not jurisdictional; it is

(I)

entirely self-imposed. See Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ,r 13,266 P.3d 828; Fort
Pierce Industrial Park Phases II, Ill & IV Owners Ass 'n v. Shakespeare, 2016 UT 28,

,r 13,379 P.3d 1218.

(ii}

Without question, it is an important doctrine that should not lightly

be set aside. It ensures judicial economy-to preclude a party from raising unpreserved
claims on appeal which require factual predicates, i.e., more trial time to resolve. See
Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ,r 15. It ensures fairness to both the trial court and opposing

party in having the opportunity to address and respond to an issue at the trial level in the
first instance. See id. ,r 16. And it precludes a party from not raising issues as a strategic
choice, only to pull them out for the first time on appeal when the trial strategy fails. See
id. As stated in DxNA's opening brief (at 5-6, citing Patterson) none of these

considerations are at work here.
The trial court's decision was wrong. Grimm recognizes it was wrong. Grimm is
in some respects equally responsible. He cited Francis without equivocation to support
12
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his claim to interest under 15-1-1 and, like DxNA, was unaware of USA Power and did
@

not alert the trial court to its error prior to entry of judgment. Further, DxNA' s failure to
raise the issue was not tactical. No one argues otherwise. The issue itself is purely legal.
To correct it requires nothing more than a simple remand to determine and apply the
correct interest rate. It's a math problem that is solvable without taking additional
evidence or holding a new trial. These narrow circumstances present no occasion to
affirm a legal error. Nor do they weaken the preservation doctrine in any respect.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand for application of the proper
interest rate to any portion of the judgment that remains intact after it resolves the merits
of the appeal.

RESPONSE TO GRIMM'S CROSS-APPEAL

III.

Grimm Failed to Make a Written Demand Under the Wage Statute.
For his cross-appeal, Grimm argues that the trial court erred in refusing to award

him the 60-day statutory penalty under Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 {LexisNexis 2011) 7 for
non-payment of his wages. This statute provides that on separation of employment, the
employee's "unpaid wages ... become due immediately, and the employer shall pay the
wages to the employee within 24 hours of the time of separation at the specified place of
payment." Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(l)(a). If the employee makes a "written demand,"
and the employer fails to pay wages within 24 hours of the demand, "the wages of the

7

GD

The wage statute was revised in 2015 but we refer to the version in effect at the time
of termination because it is controlling. See Howick v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2013 UT
App 218, ,r 38,310 P.3d 1220.
13
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employee shall continue from the date of demand until paid, but in no event to exceed 60
days, at the same rate that the employee received at the time of separation." Id.§ 34-285( 1)(b)(i). "An employee who has not made a written demand for payment is not entitled
to any penalty under Subsection ( 1)(b)." Id. § 34-28-5(1 )(b)(iii).
The statute does not define the term "demand." As a general matter, "demand" is
defined as "[t]he assertion of a legal or procedural right." Black's Law Dictionary 495
(9th ed. 2011). It means "[t]o claim as one's due; to require; to seek relief." Id. See also
www.dictionary.com/browse/demand (last visited May 14, 2017) (defining "demand" as
- "to ask for with proper authority; claim as a right; to ask for peremptorily or urgently;
to call for or require as just, proper, or necessary").
Here, the question is whether Grimm's January 23, 2011 email was a written
demand under section 34-28-5(1 )(b)(i). As the trial court found, the answer is no.
Grimm's January 23 email did not demand payment, it made what Grimm called a
"proposal" to DxNA. That is something Grimm confirmed a week later in a second email
to Jennings: "I did not consider my proposal a list of demands, rather a suggestion on
how to deal with items .... " (Def. Ex. 57.)
The items in Grimm's January 23 email were various categories of compensation
he claimed he was owed accompanied by spreadsheets showing various calculations
which the trial court found, after hearing the testimony explaining them, "confusing at
best." (R. 960.) This confusion, the trial court concluded, was "confounded" by
Grimm's "acknowledgement that the amounts owing were subject to adjustment."

(R. 960.) Grimm can express no surprise when DxNA acted with diligence and
14
STG_722453

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

circumspection in addressing all issues and claims in his January 23 email proposal rather
@

than simply cutting a check within 24 hours. This is the response that Grimm invited by
making a claim to various different agreements, attaching spreadsheets with different
calculations, and suggesting that he and Jennings sit down, discuss the details, and make

@

the appropriate adjustments.
At the time Grimm sent the email, he had not even provided DxNA with all the
information to confirm that what he was demanding was even owed-something he also
acknowledged in his January 23 email. (Pl. Ex. 17) ("I am in the process of organizing
my files to pass to Ernie and also organizing the supporting documentation (receipts)
behind my weekly expenses.").)
Grimm contends there was nothing wrong with his email and his offers to
compromise. Br. 50-52. He cautions that the statute should not be read to require
"overly strict" demands. Br. 52. The opposite is true. There is a reason the statute
Iii)

requires a demand as opposed to the confusing and confounding proposal that Grimm
sent-there are only 24 hours to respond. The demand must be something the employer
is capable of verifying and paying within the 24 hour period. Grimm's email was no
such thing. It included different and confusing spreadsheets and a range of numbers
accounting for different versions of a claimed agreement that was hotly contested. It is
not something DxNA could justifiably pay within 24 hours and Grimm did not demand
DxNAdo so.
Nowhere in his email did Grimm demand that DxNA pay him within 24 hours.
He only stated that this is what the law required but, "as we discussed, this requirement
15
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could cause immediate financial challenges for the Company so we agreed to try and find
an acceptable means of getting this balance paid." He invited DxNA to delay. He told
DxNA to delay. He invited a meeting to discuss the matter-"to make adjustments"and discuss "the mechanics of payoff and security to support the debt."
DxNA was justified in not sensing any urgency to the January 23 email based on
the language of the email as well as the follow up emails sent during the 60-day period.
(Def. Ex. 57.) Nothing suggested: You owe me this amount and you must pay it within 24

hours. It instead relayed the message: I think you owe this much, I am in the process of
providing backup information, the law says you need to pay me within 24 hours but let's

iJ

sit down instead and discuss the matter and make any necessary adjustments in case you
can't verify my claims. That is not a demand.
WiJ

To allow some soft proposal with various ranges and amounts, which invites delay
and promises to provide additional information, to morph into an after-the-fact demand
which traps an employer into a statutory penalty does not meet the purpose behind the
statute. The trial court did not err in finding that Grimm is not entitled to the statutory
penalty.

IV.

Grimm is Not Entitled to a Statutory Attorney Fees Award.
Utah Code section 34-27-1 allows an employee to recover attorney fees in a wage

suit if the employee ( 1) "establishes by the decision of the court that the amount for
which he has brought suit is justly due, and (2) that a demand has been made in writing at
least 15 days before suit was brought for a sum not to exceed the amount so found due."

16
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~

Utah Code Ann.§ 34-27-1 (LexisNexis 2011). The trial court also did not err in
awarding Grimm fees under this statute. This is so for two reasons.
First, like section 34-28-5(l)(b)(i), section 34-27-1 also requires a written demand.
Grimm did not a make a new demand. He instead relies on his January 23 email as his
demand. As explained above, and as the trial court found, that was not a proper demand.
As such, Grimm is not entitled to his attorney fees for the same reason he is not entitled
to a statutory penalty.
Second, as it indicates, under this statute, the demand may not exceed the amount
of the judgment later obtained. See Utah Code Ann.§ 34-27-1. Thus, if the resulting
judgment is less than the demand, attorney fees are not recoverable. See Francis, 2015
UT App 119, ,r 3 7. Grimm's January 23 email claims amounts exceeding the amount of
his ultimate recovery. He included in his email everything that he thought he was owed,
not just his wages, but everything he thought his contract afforded him: wages, severance,
PTO, and his expense reimbursement. (R. 942 ,r 68; Pl. Ex. 17.) Moreover, his
spreadsheet included an additional amount for an HRA claim which was lumped in with
his severance claims and then expressly abandoned at trial, recognizing that it improperly
inflated the amount he was claiming in the email as severance. (R. Trial Tr. vol. IV
117 :2-11. ) 8 As explained, the email read like a plaintiffs opening salvo at mediationstarting high knowing that it is downhill from there. But given the inclusion of these

8

He admitted to the trial court that the HRA included in his January 23 email
"shouldn't be in there." (R. Trial Tr. vol. IV 117:2-11.) That reduced his claimed
severance amounts from $126,249.89 to $125,000 and $72,836.48 to $72,115.39. (Id.)
17
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items, the total amount of Grimm's demand-$364,544.25-exceeded the amount of his
eventual recovery of $265,817.82. (R. 1122.)9 As a result, Grimm cannot obtain an
award of his attorney fees as a matter oflaw. The trial court's decision not to award fees
under section 34-27-1 must be affirmed.

V.

The Trial Court's PTO Award to Grimm was Not in Error.
Finally, Grimm argues (at 54-55) that the trial court did not properly interpret the

employment agreement, which-he claims-resulted in awarding him too little for his
claimed PTO. He claims this is a question of pure contract interpretation. Not so.
Section 2.2 of the employment agreement, upon which Grimm relies, makes
express reference to DxNA's vacation pay practices: "The Executive shall be entitled to
20 days of paid vacation each year during the Employment Term, which will accrue in
conformity with the Employer's normal vacation pay practices." Employment Agmnt. §
2.2. As a result, the trial court was tasked with determining-and Grimm with
showing-what those pay practices were. That is not a straightforward issue of contract
interpretation. The employment agreement does not define DxNA's normal pay
practices. Thus, it required a review of available extrinsic evidence to determine what is
meant by normal vacation pay practices. See Watkins v. Ford, 2013 UT 31, , 19, 304
P.3d 841. The trial court's findings are thus entitled to deference. Id.

9

$265,817.82 is the principal amount. The total award was $406,381.59, but that
included $137,811.87 in interest as well as court costs. (R. 1122.) But the statute does
not suggest that interest and court costs may be included to inflate the amount of waged
that were due.
18
STG_722453

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

vi
Grimm sought the total amount of $56,129.93 in unused PTO he claims accrued in
~

2008, 2009, and 2010 and carried over each yeear. As the trial court explained, "he
premised that claim and justified that amount 'based on the Employee Handbook which
allows accrual and carryover of PTO."' (R. 957.) But Grimm never established that any
policy of accrual and carryover applied to him as DxNA's CEO.
Grimm introduced no evidence at trial as to what the pay practices were as applied
to him. (R. 957-958.) In fact, the only evidence concerning DxNA's normal pay
practices for PTO and vacation was DxNA's employee handbook. (R. 958.) But, as the
trial court found, there were multiple versions of this employee handbook, none of which
Grimm followed. (R. 958.) It explained that if Grimm were held to DxNA's regular
personnel policies, he would not be entitled to the substantial expense reimbursement that
he was awarded because he did not follow those policies. (R. 958.) DxNA's expense
policy required timely submission of expense reports with accompanying receipts. (R.

@

943 ,I 74.) Grimm did not follow this procedure. (R. 943 ,I 75.) He did not follow
anything in the handbook. (R. 943 ,I 75) (finding, "It became quite clear during trial that
the employee handbook in whatever version was not followed by Grimm. While the
handbook refers to all employees, the ultimate authority as to the handbook and its
policies fell to Grimm."). 10 Thus, the trial court found it inconsistent for him to obtain
reimbursement of his receipts by not following policy, but claiming refuge in that policy

10

At trial, Grimm refused to even concede that there was a working employee
handbook in place at DxNA, even though he was the CEO responsible for it. And he
explained that if there was such a policy, "I can tell in practice the policy as it was related
to me was very different than what's stated here." (R. Trial Tr. vol. II 91 :7-22.)
19
@

STG_ 722453

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as it applied to vacation carry over. (R. 958.) It stated: "It is simply not appropriate for
the court to conclude that the employee handbook should apply to Grimm piecemeal."
(R. 958.)

As a result, the trial court was without evidence on which it could substantiate
(tJ

Grimm's claim that carryover of PTO was DxNA's practice as it applied to the CEO, as
Grimm claimed. (R. 958.) He could not claim the benefit of the policy for PTO, but
ignore it as inapplicable to the CEO when it came to expense reimbursements. The trial
court thus concluded that "[a]t trial Grimm testified that during 2010 he took only eight
of the twenty vacation days he was allowed per year. It is reasonable that he should be
compensated for the remaining twelve unused days for that year. To allow accrual of
PTO beyond that is not reasonable" because the "agreement does not define what the
company's normal business practices are for a CEO." (R. 958.) As such, the court
"therefore finds twelve days of Grimm's salary for 2010 to be appropriate." (R. 958.)
That interpretation was within the trial court's discretion as a fact finder faced
with an ambiguous contract which referred to "practices" outside of its four comers. To
leave no doubt, the trial court further explained its ruling after Grimm filed a postjudgment motion. "The contract as the court found it provided for 20 days of paid
vacation per year that was 'to accrue in conformity with the Employer's normal vacation
practices.' It did not provide for accumulated PTO over years as may have been the case
for other employees covered by the handbook." (R. 996.) But given that "some accrual
was contemplated," and given its reasonable interpretation of "normal vacation pay
practices" based on the evidence as trial, it concluded that under Section 2.2 Grimm
20
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should be paid the 12 remaining days of unused vacation time for 2010. (R. 996-997.)
(if)

"As such, [DxNA's] proposed calculation of $11,538.46 is the correct amount." (R.
997.)
In short, given the language of Section 2.2, it was appropriate for the trial court to
view the extrinsic evidence as to what the PTO policies were as applied to Grimm-the
CEO-and to interpret Section 2.2 accordingly. See Watkins, 2013 UT 31, 119. It did
so and made the appropriate award. Grimm has failed to confront any of the surrounding
facts and findings to demonstrate that this was error. As a result, this Court should
affirm.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse: (1) the trial court's decision that there is an
enforceable employment agreement and the award of damages which are based on the
existence of that agreement; and (2) the trial court's award of prejudgment interest.
This Court should affirm: (1) the trial court's denial of the statutory wage penalty
under Utah Code§ 34-28-5; (2) the trial court's denial of the attorney fees under Utah
Code§ 34-27-1; and (3) the trial court's decision on Grimm's PTO award.
DATED: May 17, 2017.
DURHAM JONES

& PINEGAR, P.C.

B~
ELIJAH L. MILNE

Attorneys for Appellant/
Cross-Appellee DxNA LLC
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Page I of 3

Re: Resolution

Gilbert Jennings

•
•
•

From:

Phillip Grimm [phillip.h.grimm@gmail.com) ·

Sent:

Tuesday, February 01, 2011 10:41 AM

To:

Gilbert Jennings

Cc:

Alan Gardner; bill@bickmoretechnologies.com; Jeff Norton; Jim Maples; Scott Gubler

Subject: Re: Resolution

GilbertAs I indicated to you when we met on Friday, January 21, I would be traveling until today and therefore
was not going to be able to work on making the appropriate copies of the receipts for submission.
However, I had already completed the expense reports and would organize them accordingly for
submission this week after my return. I recognize that the appropriate documentation needs to be
included prior to payment of these items .
However, this should not delay nor defer response to my prior email where I outlined basic thoughts on
how to move forward. In that email I swnmarized various categories of expenses with supporting
documentation and provided some thoughts on moving forward. I do not think that the· exact amount of
the expenses effects the ability to respond and begin to move forward. It is indisputable that DxNA has a
financial obligation to me and I am sure that we will sort out the exact amount. In the interim, I need to
understand that the three critical items I suggested will be met. First and foremost, the obligation needs to
have the appropriate level of security behind it, that a monthly payment will be made to reduce the
balance and interest, consistent with that of other debts, will accrue against the outstanding monthly
balance. Given that it is now February I, a settlement payment for January could be considered past due
with February now due.
My preference is to work through this in the manner in which we discussed in our January 21 meeting,
that being one of mutual cooperation and professionalism. Many weeks have past and I have received no
definitive letter related to my position with DxNA, I have spent considerable time organizing the various
items necessary in this matter and have reached out multiple times to get some level of clarity. I am
doing this because I do want to see DxNA succeed but also recognize that there are certain requirements
that I should expect be met from DxNA.

•

•

As it relates to any employment contracts, agreements or otherwise. You have copies of the many
exchanges of emails initiated by Glory's attorney for this matter. These include contracts attachments,
initiated by them, that clearly outline the understanding of our agreement. You are also aware that a
contract existed when I was first hired by DxNA. I do not believe it serves either ofus to further discuss
this matter, unless there is an attempt on the part of the DxNA BOD to nullify that an agreement is
present. My prior email clearly outlined the two various positions that could be taken in this area and I
pass this back to you for your reply.
While I recognize that there are many outstanding issues that you and the other member of the Board
must address, I ask that attention be given to this and a quick response be provided. It has been three
weeks since your email that set this in motion and it needs to be reconciled so all parties understand how
we are to move forward .
I am available to speak with you today or meet in person tomorrow.

Thanks

•

Phil
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ii
Phillip H. Grimm
PO Box429
Draper, UT 84020

(D

cell: 602 52~2433

~

From: Gilbert Jennings <giJc-ert<ai.mt::£..COiri>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 09:29:43 -0700
To: Phillip Grimm <phHiip.h.g;-irm-;-i(@gff.ail.com>
Cc: Alan Gardner <aian.~.mrdnertw.washco.utah.gov>, <bH!@.bickmoretechnciog;es.com>, JeffNorton
<sunpo0ls@infm~1est.com>, Jim Maples <Hm.Maoies(@dxns.com>, Scott Gubler <scott2"widesei'et~ab$.corrl>
Subject: RE: Resolution
Phil:
Thanks for the reminder. Yes, things have been extremely busy the last few days.
I had expected that you were going to send the appropriate documentation to us regarding expenses etc. that you
were asking for reimbursem~nt. Would you please send us copies of the expense report and all receipts for
expenditures. I would note that it is proper for the receipt to be included, not just a line item on a credit card
statement The Board has suggested that all documented expenses will be considered for reimbursement.
I would make still another request for a copy of any contract that you might have regarding other compensation
issues for review. This would be very helpful for us to consider the information you had summarized in your prior
email.

We are meeting later this morning trying to find some stable ground to move forward from.
Thanks,
Gilbert Jennings

From: Phillip Grimm [rnai!to:ohimp.h.grimm@Gmaii.com]
Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2011 9:27 PM
To: Gilbert Jennfngs; GIibert Jennings
Subject: Resolution

GilbertI wanted to check with you to see where we are on getting resolution to the separation items. Another week has
passed and we really need to get these items resolved so I can focus my attention on other matters. In the
shareholder meeting you indicated that I had given you 'a list of demands'. I did not consider my proposal a list
of demands, rather a suggestion on how to deal with the items created through decisions made at the BOD level. I
recognize that you are busy but ask that you give this your attention so we can reach resolution.
Let me know if you would like to meet or discuss this on the phone. I am busy Monday but will be available
Tuesday if necessary.
Thanks
Phillip H. Grimm

(3J
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